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LONGITUDINAL STUDY ON THE PERFORMANCE OF U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS: 
THE INCREASING ROLE OF MARKETING 
 
L.H. Pattikawa 
 
ABSTRACT  
Nowadays, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry has been under thorough scrutiny. Popular press claims of 
intensive marketing activities that go beyond R&D, the strong increase of me-too drugs, and, at the 
same time, the high industry profitability have contributed to public skepticism. Despite this increasing 
role of marketing, studies on the profitability of pharmaceutical firms mainly focus on the role of R&D. 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of advertising and product differentiation on pharmaceutical 
firms’ market value over the period 1971-2005. Especially, we examine whether there has been a 
change in the pattern of returns in these variables over this period. Our results show that, nowadays, 
pharmaceutical firms’ performance is not only closely linked to their R&D activities but also to 
marketing activities such as advertising and product differentiation. Since the 1990s, the return of 
advertising has become three times larger than that of R&D. In addition, we found that the impact of 
product differentiation came largely from the introduction of the so called incrementally modified drugs 
(IMD). The vast increase of the number of IMDs since the 1990s is likely to contribute to this 
development. Our results emphasize the role of advertising and product differentiation in the virtuous 
rent-seeking behavior in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Keywords: advertising, product differentiation, marketing, market value, panel data, pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
Frequent abbreviations 
New chemical entity (NCE): drug that contains no active compound that has been marketed before. 
Incrementally Modified Drugs (IMD): modifications of existing NCE’s 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
Popular press often claims that major pharmaceutical companies put more emphasis on marketing than 
on R&D (Public Citizen, 2001; Rellman and Angell, 2002). As a result of the entire lift of DTC 
advertising in 1997, drug companies’ spendings on DTC advertising of drug products increased twice as 
fast as spending on promotion to physicians or on research and development in the period 1997-2005 
(GAO, 2006). Over this period, drug companies spent less each year on DTC advertising ($4.2 billion in 
2005) than on promotion to physicians ($7.2 billion in 2005) or R&D ($31.4 billion in 2005) (GAO, 
2006). At the same time, the practice of line extension among major pharmaceutical firms has increased 
strongly over the past 30 years (Public Citizen, 2001; Craig and Malek, 1995, Relman and Angell, 2002; 
GAO2, 2006).  
Indeed, next to R&D expenditure, advertising expenditure is of strategic importance for firms’ survival. 
Firms can use R&D and/or advertising expenditure as choice variables responding to increased 
competition. Indeed, past empirical studies in the various industries demonstrate the significant effect of 
R&D and advertising on firms’ profitability (Griliches, 1981; Jaffe, 1986; Hall, 1993). The roles of 
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R&D and advertising, as well as product differentiation, are especially important in the pharmaceutical 
industry where firms do not fully compete in terms of price and products are highly differentiated 
(Matraves, 1999). The escalation of R&D, advertising and the vast increase of product modifications 
have been claimed to increase the economies of scale and contribute to the industry’s high profitability 
(Matraves, 1999; Craig and Malek, 1995).  
Scherer (2001) points out several ways in which R&D investment can be linked with profitability. First, 
successful R&D projects result in new roducts in the next period that eventually lead to profit. Second, 
high profitability can lead to increase in R&D expenditure in the next period. Although findings from 
studies on the link between internal funding and R&D are still mixed, pharmaceutical firms probably 
depend more on internal funding to finance their R&D activities than on external resources 
(Himmelberg and Peterson, 1994; McCutchen, Jr., 1993). Third, the link between profitability and R&D 
can be traced through the demand-pull mechanism in which expected profitability in certain 
therapeutical markets increases firms’ R&D expenditure on that area (CBO, 2006). 
Simultaneously, advertising can be linked with profitability in various ways (Erickson and Jacobson, 
1991). First, advertising seeks to differentiate the firms’ products and therefore can enhance brand 
loyalty and reputation. This loyalty and reputation can in turn enable firms to set higher prices than 
products with similar qualities. In addition, the long term effect of advertising can discourage potential 
entrants to enter in an intensive advertised industry (Waldman and Jensen, 2001).  
Product differentiation is closely related with firms’ advertising activities. In highly advertised 
industries, products are usually differentiated (Matraves, 1999). Product differentiation, accompanied 
with advertising campaigns, can affect performance through the process of enlarging consumer choice 
and through market segmentation that satisfies consumer demand more precisely (Connor, 1981). 
Additionally, in the U.S., product differentiation enables drug firms to obtain market exclusivity 
(Pattikawa, 2007). For example, when a drug company introduces an drug with a new chemical entity, it 
will be granted a marketing exclusivity for a period of five years. Within this period, no generic versions 
can be approved and therefore the company has the opportunity to invest in brand names. Furthermore, 
the company usually benefit from this exclusivity period by launching product extensions that can lead 
to additional marketing exclusivity period (Pattikawa, 2007; Pattikawa, 2006).  
Scherer (2001) emphasizes the importance of R&D and advertising activities and argues that they play 
an important role in the concept of “virtuous rent-seeking” that characterizes pharmaceutical markets 
(Scherer, 2001). He describes this concept as follows: “… that is, as profit opportunities expand, firms 
compete to exploit them by increasing R&D investments, and perhaps also promotional costs, until the 
increases in costs dissipate most, if not all, supranormal profit returns…”  
Despite the vast increase of advertising expenditure, as well as the high degree of product differentiation 
associated with it, few empirical studies examine their relationship with the profitability of 
pharmaceutical firms. Instead, the focus has been on the R&D role on pharmaceutical firms’ 
profitability (Scherer, 2001; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990; Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi, 2001; 
OTA, 1993).  
Against this background, this paper studies the role of advertising and product differentiation for 
pharmaceutical firms’ market value. Additionally, we want to compare the returns of advertising with 
that of R&D. Our study provides an opportunity to test the proposition that drug firms in fact put more 
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emphasis on marketing activities than on R&D. Our study contributes to the existing research in the 
following three ways. First, our approach enables us to investigate simultaneously the return of various 
intangibles assets of pharmaceutical firms that include R&D, advertising and product differentiation. 
Doing so allows us to compare the pattern of advertising returns with that of R&D over time.  
Second, we are one of the first to study the impact of various intangible assets such as innovation, brand 
names and product introduction on U.S. pharmaceutical firms’ market value over a long time period.  
Despite their valuable contributions, studies on the return of R&D in the pharmaceutical firms cover a 
relatively short period of time (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi, 2001; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990). 
The relatively long study coverage allows us to asses whether there has been a shift in the patterns of the 
return of various assets of pharmaceutical firms. Furthermore, by examining these returns over a long 
time period we can gain a better understanding of pharmaceutical firms’ behavior. This understanding 
can eventually be used to reduce the gap between private and social return (Hall, 2000). 
Third, studies on R&D return in the pharmaceutical industry generally use accounting measures such as 
profits, sales or cash flows (Grabowski, Vernon, and DiMasi, 2001; Grabowski and Vernon, 1990). The 
time lags between the initial R&D decision and its final output in the form of new drug products provide 
limitations in measuring the direct impact of R&D on firms’ profitability. Our study uses a market 
valuation model that provides an alternative solution to this problem (Griliches, 1981; Hall, 1993). This 
approach leaves the valuation of firms’ strategic decision, including R&D, advertising and product 
differentiation strategies, to the financial markets. Using financial markets’ evaluation avoids the 
problem of timing of costs and revenue described above and is capable of forward-looking evaluation, 
which traditional accounting approaches do not do well (Hall, 1993).  
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline the theoretical framework based on 
the seminal work of Griliches (1981). Section 3 presents the methodology where we explain the 
independent variables in our model. This section also provides the data and the sample selection we 
used. Additionally, we present the estimation procedures we used and our model specifications. Section 
4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the present paper by discussing the most important findings 
and their implications for innovation in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Using market value to measure the return of intangible assets is based on the assumption that the value 
of company intangible assets, that include R&D, patents, advertising, and product differentiation, are 
determined frequently in the financial markets. The basic model hypothesizes that the market value of a 
pharmaceutical company is a function of all company assets, both tangible and intangible (Griliches, 
1981; Hall, 2000). 
V (A1,A2,A3,…) = f (A1,A2,A3,…)     (1) 
where f is an unknown function that describes how the combination of company assets creates value. 
Since the functional form of (1) is unknown, economists usually use an ad hoc linear function. 
Pioneered by Griliches (1981), this model gained popularity as indicated  by a considerable number of 
papers using this model (for a review see Hall, 2000). This model is expressed as follows (for simplicity 
reasons we omit the time aspect): 
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where Vi is the current market value of company i as by the end of the year and Ai is the current value 
of the company’s conventional assets. Kij denotes the jth intangible asset of company i, and N is the 
total number of intangible assets. γj denotes  the parameter of variable K, while q is the current market 
valuation coefficient of the company’s assets, reflecting its differential risk and monopoly position 
(Griliches, 1981).  From equation (2), we take the logarithm of both sides: 
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Letting Kji/Ai = Iji and adding a disturbance term, we get the following empirical equation 
iji
N
j
jii uIq +++= ∑
=1
logA logV log γσσ    (3) 
Under constant return to scale, this model implies that σ, the coefficient of log Ai, is unity. Furthermore, 
the intercept of the model (log q) can be interpreted as an estimate of the logarithmic average of Tobin’s 
q for the sampled companies during the sample period (Hall, 2000).  
3 METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Independent Variables Included in the Model 
We include the variables of interest in the equation 3; R&D, advertising, and product differentiation. As 
a measure of product differentiation, we use the annual number of product introductions that include 
NCEs and IMDs. Following Hall (1993), we include several control variables. We included cash flow 
(net of advertising and R&D) as a proxy for any market power or long-run profitability of companies. 
We also included the growth rate of sales in the present year to capture the prospects for future growth 
of pharmaceutical companies in our sample. Even though this variable might be a product of company’s 
R&D and other investments, we assume that it is not completely captured by the current level of R&D 
expenditure (Hall, 1993). To control for specific industry movement, we included the weighted average 
of industry return in our model. 
We excluded patent variables because we did not find any significant effect of patent variables in the 
initial analysis. For this purpose, we used several measures of patents, such as patent counts, patent 
citations, and importance of patent such as patent originality and generality1. The weak relation between 
                                                 
1 For more explanations on these terms see http://www.nber.org/patents/pat63_99.txt.  
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patents and market values can be traced to several factors. First, a review of existing studies shows that 
the patent is an indication of the same phenomenon as R&D variables but in a noisier way (Hall, 2000; 
Bosworth and Mahdian 1999). Second, R&D variables and patents did not always play significant roles 
when jointly included (Stoneman and Bosworth, 1994). Griliches, Pakes and Hall (1987) argued that 
patent count is a noisy measure of the underlying economic value of the innovations to which they are 
associated. Furthermore, patents have highly skewed distributions suggesting that few patents are highly 
valued and that many are worth little. Nevertheless, Hall (2000) argued that weighted patent, such as 
patent citation index, provides a better measure than simply counting the granted patent different 
measures of patent citations and the importance of patents. Our preliminary analysis showed, however, 
that these measures also had a negligible effect on firms’ market value. 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
We specify two models. In the first model, we include the annual number of total products introduction 
as a proxy for product differentiation. In the second model, we split the product introductions into two 
categories; NCEs and IMDs. Doing so enables us to look at the individual effect of each of this product 
group.1 In addition, we include the interaction variable of R&D and advertising to check whether the 
impact of R&D is strengthened by advertising and vice versa. Table 1 provides the definition of the 
variables used in the models. The two models can be specified as follows.  
Model (1) 
log Vit = log qt + σ log A it + γ1 R&D /A it + γ2Adv/A it + γ3 CF/A it +  
γ4 Δlog S it + γ5DCEit +  γ6(R&D /A)* (Adv/A) it +γ7Total it  + γ8Index t +u it    
Model (2) 
log Vit = log qt + σ log A it + γ1 R&D /A it + γ2Adv/A it + γ3 CF/A it +  
γ4ΔlogSit+γ5DCEit+γ6(R&D/A)*(Adv/A)it+γ7NCE it +γ8IMDit+ γ9Index t+u it    
We perform regression analysis for the period 1971-2005. In addition, we also run a separate analysis 
for the two periods and see whether there is any shift of assets return from the first period (1971-1989) 
to the second period (1990-2005). 
 
                                                 
1 In the preliminary analysis, we also included the square terms of IMDs and the interaction term between IMDs 
and NCE, but we removed these terms because they did not have significant coefficient in any of the equation.  
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Table 1 Definition and Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Log Vit  logarithm of market value of company i at time t; market value 
is defined as stock price multiplied by number of outstanding 
stocks plus debt 
Log qt   intercept 
Log A it  logarithm of total tangible assets of company i at time t 
R&D/A it ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets 
Adv/A it advertising to assets ratio  
CF/A it cash flow to assets ratio 
Δlog S it growth of sales 
DCE it  debt to equity ratio; represents the capital structure of the 
company 
R&D/A it * Adv/A 
it
Interaction between R&D and advertising1
Total it number of total products launched (NCEs, IMDs and generics) 
in year t by company i2
NCE it number of  NCEs introduced in year t by company i 
IMD it number of IMDs introduced in year t by company i 
Index t value weighted average of industry return 
 
3.3 Estimation Procedure 
A pooled test (Breusch Pagan multiplier test)3, which tests the null hypothesis of whether a company’s 
specific error term is zero, is significant at the 1% level (χ2=25.66). This indicates that performing 
ordinary least square (OLS) on pooled data will result in inefficient estimates. Therefore, we use fixed 
effect (FE) and random effect (RE) estimators that take into account companies’ specific error terms 
(Verbeek, 2000).  The FE estimator assumes that a company’s specific effects are constant and do not 
vary over time. This is comparable to inserting a dummy for each company and applying OLS to the 
regression equation that is transformed into deviations from individual means.  
The RE estimator, on the other hand, treats a company’s specific error as a part of the error term. The 
RE estimator is a generalized least square (GLS) estimator that is obtained by exploiting the structure of 
the error covariance matrix (Verbeek, 2000). The Hausman test (Hausman 1978) can be performed to 
 
1 We standardize R&D/A and Adv/A in the operationalization of this interaction variable. 
2 We do not divide the number of product introduction with total assets because it produces very small quantities 
that lead to substantially high coefficients. Therefore, we include the product’s variable in absolute form, not in 
ratio like any other intangible assets.  
3 This test investigates whether the data can be pooled and ordinary least square (OLS) estimation can be 
performed. 
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choose between the FE- or RE- estimator. Under the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between 
company specific effects with the regressors both estimators are consistent but the RE estimate is 
efficient, while fixed effects are not. Under the alternative hypothesis that a company’s specific effects 
are correlated with the regressors, RE estimators are inconsistent, while FE estimators are consistent and 
efficient.  
3.4 Data Descriptions 
For a detailed description on the selection of drug products and companies we refer to appendix A. We 
link the product database with financial data from COMPUSTAT. We replace missing values in 
advertising by using information from annual reports and by using extrapolation. For more details on 
this procedure we refer to appendix B. Industry index is obtained from the Kenneth R. French website1. 
The resulting database, after merging financial data and drugs approval data, comprises of 27 companies 
in the period 1971-2005. The minimal number of observation within one company is 6 and the maximal 
number is 35. As such, we have unbalanced panel data with 599 company-year observations. 
 
4 RESULTS 
In figure 1 we present the trend in the market value of pharmaceutical firms in our sample in 
comparison with the trend in NCE and IMD introductions in the period 1971-2005. This figure shows 
that there was a simultaneously sharp increase in the number of NCEs, IMDs and market value in the 
period 1994-1997. In 1996, the number of NCEs was at the highest in the history. At the same year, the 
number of IMDs also increased significantly compared to the previous years. A similar trend applies to 
the stocks valuation of pharmaceutical firms. After 1996, the number of NCEs has somewhat slowed 
down and reached the lowest in the past 30 years level in 2005. Meanwhile the market value and the 
number of IMDs stay at a relatively high level in that period.  
Figure 2 shows the trend of R&D and advertising expenditures in comparison with market value. Both 
R&D and advertising expenditures have been increasing in the period 1971-2005. There has been, 
however, an increasing gap between these two figures. Since 1975, the R&D expenditure increased 
faster than that of advertising expenditure. Based on this figure, we can reject the claims that 
pharmaceutical firms spent more on advertising than on R&D expenditure (Public Citizen, 2001). 
However, we cautiously note that in our data advertising expenditure is likely an underestimation of the 
real figure, due to substantially missing values of advertising in COMPUSTAT (see also appendix B). 
 
1 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html  
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Figure 1 Market Value and the Annual Number of NCEs and IMDs (1971-2005)  
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Figure 2 Market Value, R&D and Advertising expenditure of Pharmaceutical Firms (1971-2005) 
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We present the descriptive statistics of the variables in table 2. We also provide separate descriptive 
statistics for period 1971-1989 and 1990-2005 in table 3 and table 4, respectively. On average, almost 
all assets increased from the first period to the second period. For example, the average of market value 
(in logarithm) has increased from 7.50 in the period 1970-1989 to 9.79 within the period 1990-2005. At 
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the same time, its volatility was somewhat reduced, as the standard deviation of this variable has 
decreased from the first to the second period. R&D to assets ratio and the degree of product 
differentiation in the second period was also higher than the first one. While a firm introduced on 
average 1.55 products in the period 1970-1989, it increased to 3.62 in the second period. A remarkable 
growth is observed for incremental products, which have increased from an average 0.86 to 2.90 
introductions a year. There was also a slight increase in the average number of NCEs from the first to 
the second period. 
Curiously, the intensity of outside debt has decreased. In the period 1970-1989, an average debt to 
equity ratio was 0.36, while in the period 1989-2005 it was only 0.16. This figure might support the 
position that pharmaceutical firms’ are increasingly dependent on internal resources in financing 
investment activities (Scherer, 2001). Furthermore, despite the vast increase of advertising expenditure, 
the ratio of advertising to assets is relatively stable in the period under study. The same also applies to 
growth variable.  
The estimation results of the three models for the whole period (1971-2005) are presented in table 5. 
Each model is estimated by three estimation procedures (OLS, FE and RE). The first three columns in 
table 5 present the estimates of model 1. The last three columns present the estimates of model 2, in 
which we split the product variable into NCEs and IMDs. The estimation results in the period 1971-
1989 and the period 1990-2005 are presented in table 6 and table 7, respectively. All regressions are 
performed with robust variance estimate (Huber, 1967; White 1980; Rogers, 1993). Additionally, we 
exclude outliers that were under the 5% percentile and above the 95% percentile of the log of market 
value. As a result, the observations were reduced from 599 to 538. The minimal number of observation 
within one company was reduced to 2 and the maximal number stayed at 35. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics, 1971-2005 (N=599) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Deviation 
LogMV Log market value 8.74  2.04 
LogAssets Log Assets 7.90  1.77 
R&D/A R&D to assets 0.09  0.05 
Advertising Advertising to assets 0.04  0.05 
DCE Debt to Equity 0.25  0.32 
D log sales Change in log sales 0.14  0.23 
Product Total products 2.68  3.14 
CFA Cash Flow to Assets 0.04  0.04 
NCE Innovative drug products 0.49  0.79 
IMD Incremental drug products 1.97  2.73 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics, 1971-1989 (N=271) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Deviation 
LogMV Log market value 7.50  1.81 
LogAssets Log Assets 6.96  1.52 
R&D/A R&D to assets 0.07  0.05 
Advertising Advertising to assets 0.05  0.06 
DCE Debt to Equity 0.36  0.43 
D log sales Change in log sales 0.14  0.25 
CFA Cash Flow to Assets 0.04  0.04 
Product Total products 1.55  1.86 
NCE Innovative drug products 0.40  0.69 
IMD Incremental drug products 0.86  1.26 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics, 1990-2005 (N=328) 
Variable Definition Mean St. Deviation 
LogMV Log market value 9.79 1.60 
LogAssets Log Assets 8.68 1.57 
R&D/A R&D to assets 0.10 0.05 
Advertising Advertising to assets 0.04  0.03 
DCE Debt to Equity 0.16  0.15 
D log sales Change in log sales 0.14  0.21 
CFA Cash Flow to Assets 0.04 0.05 
Product Total products 3.62  3.64 
NCE Innovative drug products 0.58  0.87 
IMD Incremental drug products 2.90  3.24 
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Table 5 OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimation, 1971-2005 (27 companies, N= 538) 
Model 1 Model 2   
  OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Logarithm of Assets 0.929*** 0.936*** 0.926*** 0.927*** 0.935*** 0.926*** 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
R&D to assets 2.266*** 2.479*** 2.388*** 2.249*** 2.481*** 2.390*** 
  (0.670) (0.579) (0.528) (0.702) (0.578) (0.528) 
Advertising to assets 1.364* 1.801** 1.622*** 1.351* 1.791** 1.614*** 
 (0.734) (0.707) (0.615) (0.737) (0.711) (0.624) 
Cash Flow to Assets 2.793*** 2.870*** 2.983*** 2.807*** 2.819*** 2.940*** 
 (0.713) (0.513) (0.477) (0.712) (0.516) (0.480) 
Δ log sales 0.098 0.062 0.047 0.099 0.064 0.049 
  (0.141) (0.137) (0.122) (0.142) (0.138) (0.123) 
Debt to equity  -1.685*** -1.662*** -1.579*** -1.675*** -1.663*** -1.580*** 
  (0.173) (0.155) (0.145) (0.173) (0.154) (0.144) 
Advertising x R&D 0.033 0.085** 0.077** 0.031 0.083** 0.076** 
 (0.045) (0.034) (0.031) (0.048) (0.034) (0.031) 
Total  0.019** 0.018*** 0.018*** _ _ _ 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) _ _ _ 
NCE _ _ _ 0.027 0.024 0.024 
  _ _ _ (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) 
IMD _ _ _ 0.019* 0.017** 0.017 
  _ _ _ (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Industry Index -1.565*** -1.684*** -1.704*** -1.568*** -1.680*** -1.701*** 
 (0.246) (0.133) (0.128) (0.236) (0.134) (0.128) 
R2 ~ 0.959 0.952 0.958 0.959 0.952 0.958 
Χ2  (Hausman Test) +  n.a. ^  n.a. ^ 
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significantly different from 0 at 10%;** significantly different from 0 at 5%;*** significantly different from 0 at 1%; 
+ Prob> χ2 is in parenthesis; ~ R2 refers to within R2 and overall R2 for respectively FE and RE. ^ not available due to small sample property 
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Table 6 OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimation, 1971-1989 (18 Companies, N= 246) 
Model 1 Model 2   
  OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Logarithm of Assets 0.864*** 0.816*** 0.823*** 0.865*** 0.817*** 0.826*** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) 
R&D to assets 3.652*** 4.035** 4.092*** 3.646* 4.081** 4.134*** 
  (1.779) (1.647) (1.294) (1.800) (1.665) (1.302) 
Advertising to assets 2.096* 4.758* 3.851*** 2.098* 4.779* 3.857*** 
 (1.125) (2.739) (1.213) (1.133) (2.756) (1.213) 
Cash Flow to Assets 2.501*** 3.315*** 3.146*** 2.493** 3.227*** 3.103*** 
 (1.085) (0.775) (0.725) (1.101) (0.780) (0.731) 
Δ log sales -0.238*** -0.183*** -0.197*** -0.236*** -0.179*** -0.196*** 
  (0.054) (0.067) (0.063) (0.055) (0.068) (0.063) 
Debt to equity  -1.571*** -1.504*** -1.492*** -1.569*** -1.504*** -1.491*** 
  (0.194) (0.197) (0.170) (0.193) (0.119) (0.170) 
Advertising x R&D 0.111 0.252*** 0.218*** 0.111 0.255*** 0.219*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.059) (0.092) (0.092) (0.060) 
Total Product 0.016 0.017** 0.015* _ _ _ 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) _ _ _ 
NCE _ _ _ 0.015  0.015 0.018 
  _ _ _ (0.027)  (0.020) (0.021) 
IMD _ _ _ 0.018  0.021 0.015 
  _ _ _ (0.016) ( 0.014) (0.014) 
Industry Index -1.388*** -1.169*** -1.216*** -1.391*** -1.166*** -1.217*** 
 (0.294) (0.161) (0.159) (0.300) (0.161) (0.160) 
R2  ~ 0.948 0.964 0.945 0.948 0.897 0.945 
Χ2  (Hausman Test) +  n.a. ^   1.22   (0.995) 
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significantly different from 0 at 10%;** significantly different from 0 at 5%;*** significantly different from 0 at 1%; 
+ Prob> χ2 is in parenthesis; ~ R2 refers to within R2 and overall R2 for respectively FE and RE. ^ not available due to small sample property 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
Table 7 OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimation, 1990-2005 (25 Companies, N= 292) 
Model 1 Model 2   
  OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
Logarithm of Assets 0.999*** 0.998*** 0.992*** 0.999*** 0.996*** 0.991*** 
  (0.026) (0.054) (0.043) (0.027) (0.055) (0.044) 
R&D to assets 1.741** 1.888*** 1.795*** 1.752*** 1.900*** 1.804*** 
  (0.721) (0.395) (0.366) (0.713) (0.392) (0.366) 
Advertising to assets 3.625*** 4.249*** 3.741*** 3.594*** 4.209** 3.706*** 
 (1.039) (1.185) (0.956) (1.055) (1.194) (0.977) 
Cash Flow to Assets 3.239*** 2.684*** 2.861*** 3.246*** 2.640*** 2.828*** 
 (0.709) (0.965) (0.764) (0.709) (0.966) (0.771) 
Δ log sales 0.540*** 0.513*** 0.516*** 0.541*** 0.517*** 0.519*** 
  (0.121) (0.113) (0.108) (0.120) (0.111) (0.108) 
Debt to equity  -2.044*** -1.891*** -1.930*** -2.031*** -1.882*** -1.920*** 
 (0.230) (0.268) (0.210) (0.233) (0.268) (0.210) 
Advertising x R&D -0.039 0.000 -0.008 -0.039 -0.003 -0.009 
  (0.051) (0.029) (0.024) (0.050) (0.029) (0.024) 
Total Product 0.010 0.019** 0.016** _ _ _ 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) _ _ _ 
NCE _ _ _ 0.016 0.020 0.017 
  _ _ _ (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) 
IMD _ _ _ 0.009 0.020** 0.017* 
  _ _ _ (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Industry Index -1.800*** -2.104*** -2.032*** -1.825*** -2.134*** -2.057*** 
 (0.350) (0.353) (0.361) (0.341) (0.349) (0.357) 
R2 ~ 0.949 0.875 0.948 0.949 0.876 0.948 
Χ2  (Hausman Test) +  1.84  (0.994)  1.29 (0.999) 
Standard errors are in parentheses; *significantly different from 0 at 10%;** significantly different from 0 at 5%;*** significantly different from 0 at 1%; 
+ Prob> χ2 is in parenthesis; ~ R2 refers to within R2 and overall R2 for respectively FE and RE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
The R&D coefficients for the total period (1971-2005) are positive and significant, although they are 
relatively low compared to the past findings (Hall, 2000). Our R&D coefficients are centered approximately 
on 2.4, while findings from the past studies are centered on 5 or 6. Still, our R&D coefficients are within the 
range. The advertising coefficient is somewhat lower than R&D, which is approximately 1.8 in the 
regression over the whole period (1971-2005). Looking at the effect of product differentiation, our results 
show that product differentiation have positive impact on market value. In the period under study, an 
introduction of a new product increases the market value by approximately 18%. This effect is likely a 
result of the vast increase of IMD introductions since none of NCE coefficients is significant.  
Comparing the results in the period 1971-1989 and that of 1990-2005, we found somewhat different 
patterns. In the period 1990-2005, we found that the coefficient of advertising to assets is almost three times 
as large as the coefficient of R&D to assets, while their coefficients are more or less similar in the period 
1971-1989. In other words, the gap between the return of advertising and that of R&D becomes larger as we 
move from the first to the second period. Compared to Hall (1993) that found 4 to 5 times smaller 
advertising coefficients than that of R&D expenditures, our findings seem to show the opposite. The 
difference might be due to the nature of the industry; Hall (1993) study covered various U.S. industries, 
while we concentrate on U.S. pharmaceutical firms.  
Additionally, we found a positive interaction effect between R&D and advertising intensities in the first 
period, which implies that their effects on market value strengthen each other. Nonetheless, this interaction 
effect is relatively small compared to the main effects. In the period 1990-2005, we do not find a significant 
interaction effect. 
In the period 1971-1989, the impact of total product introduction on firms’ market value is positive and 
significant. When we move from the first to the second period, this effect becomes slightly bigger. 
According to fixed effect estimator, an introduction of a new product in the period 1990-2005 will on 
average increase market value by 19%. Interestingly, similar with the regression results from the whole 
period, NCEs do not have significant impact on the market value in the period 1990-2005, while IMDs do. 
This is probably due to the relatively stable and small number of NCE introductions compared to that of 
IMDs. 
 Looking at the control variables, the coefficients of cash flow to assets are positive and significant, which 
is line with the findings by Hall (1993). The impact of cash flow in the latter period, however, is slightly 
reduced compared to the period 1971-1989. As expected, the effect of higher debt leverage is negative and 
significant, which confirms previous findings (Toivanen, Stoneman, and Bosworth, 2002). This finding 
implies that high debt leveraged pharmaceutical firms are less valued than their peers with a relatively low 
level of external financing. The magnitude of leverage effects increases as we move from period 1971-1989 
to the period 1990-2005. This finding shows that nowadays pharmaceutical firms are likely to be less 
dependent on external financing compared to the earlier period (1970-1989). The coefficient of industry 
index is negative and significant in all regressions, which indicates a negative relationship between 
pharmaceutical firms’ market performance in our sample and the average return of all drugs firms. Note that 
the latter includes not only drug firms, but also, for example, biotech firms, medicine and chemical firms, 
and pharmaceutical preparation firms7. 
 
7 For details definitions of the industry portfolio we refer to 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html  
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In contrast to previous findings (Hall, 1993), the coefficient of growth is not significant. This might indicate 
that pharmaceutical firms feed their growth mainly from R&D activities. In the period 1971-1989, the 
coefficients of growth of sales are negative and significant, while they are positive and significant in the 
second period. Looking at the whole period, the effects are negligible, perhaps as a result of the opposite 
results in the two periods. Assuming that we have specified the model correctly, one of the explanations of 
these findings is as follows. In the period 1971-1989, investors’ expectations regarding the pharmaceutical 
firms’ profitability was less optimistic than in the period 1990-2005. Prior to the 1990s, the increase in 
profitability due to the rise in sales was probably spent on the next period R&D, which eventually reduced 
the total amount for the dividend pay out. This is in contrast with the second period where investors’ 
confidence was rising due to the vast increase of profitability. Noteworthy, this increasing optimism is 
probably due to the U.S. market trend in general (Pattikawa, 2007 see figure 3.13). 
Summarizing, our results show the importance of advertising and product differentiation in stock market 
valuation of the U.S. pharmaceutical firms. Although the R&D expenditure is much higher than advertising 
over the years, since 1990, the returns of advertising have become three times as high as that of R&D. In 
addition, product differentiation has positive and significant effects on market value.  This effect is probably 
a result of the vast increase of IMD introductions over the years.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, we examine the impact of advertising and product differentiation on pharmaceutical firms’ 
performance. Our results emphasize the role of advertising and product differentiation in the virtuous rent-
seeking behavior in the pharmaceutical industry. Despite the theoretical importance of these variables, the 
existing empirical studies mainly concentrated on the role of R&D in the profitability of pharmaceutical 
firms. Our study is important in that it provides a better understanding of pharmaceutical firms’ behavior. 
This understanding can be used as part of policy makers and economists attempt to quantify the private 
returns on innovation and advertising activities in order assess their contribution to industry growth. In turn, 
this understanding can be a guide for strategies that aim to close the gap between private and social returns 
(Hall, 2000). In addition, our study also provides a possibility to test the claim of popular press that 
pharmaceutical firms put more emphasis on advertising than on R&D activities.  
Our findings show significant impacts of advertising and product differentiation on firms’ market value. In 
terms of expenditure, we do not find any evidence that pharmaceutical firms spend more on advertising than 
on R&D. After 1980, the R&D expenditure has always surpassed the advertising expenditure. However, our 
regression results show that nowadays the returns of advertising have become three times as large as that of 
R&D. This “opposite” findings can be interpreted in several ways. First, although the R&D is higher in the 
absolute terms, firms might use advertising more effectively. Furthermore, the rise in R&D expenditure 
does not necessarily lead to the corresponding increase of investors’ optimism regarding firms’ innovation 
performance. This is perhaps due to the fact that R&D expenditure is mainly withdrawn to finance minor 
innovations.  
As expected, product differentiation has a positive and significant contribution to firms’ market value. On 
average, an introduction of a new drug product increases market value by 18%. The role of IMDs herein is 
presumably of major importance since we found that the NCE introductions do not have significant effects. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficients is larger than that of IMDs.  
Relating our findings to the pattern of innovation in the industry, we argue that the explosion of market 
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value has not been the sole consequence of more innovation in the industry. The current behavior of drug 
companies, i.e. frequent launching of incremental drugs accompanied by effective use of advertising and the 
escalation of R&D expenditure, seems to get its reward in the financial market.  
From the academic perspective, we show that incorporating a proxy for product differentiation can give a 
more complete picture of the fundamental values of publicly traded pharmaceutical companies. Although a 
company valuation has been intensively studied, existing research focuses primarily on the innovation 
input, i.e. R&D, or intermediate output (i.e. patents). Our study complements the existing literature by 
including final output of innovation activities in the model, measured by the number of product 
introductions.  
As all research, we acknowledge limitations of our results. We have a considerable number of missing 
values for advertising in our dataset. Therefore, our results are depending on the accuracy of our estimates 
on the missing values of advertising. This, however, would have been overcome if pharmaceutical 
companies provided data on their advertising expenditures. Hence, we recommend that the drug companies 
should provide information on their advertising expenditures, aside from their administration and 
distribution expenditures. Additionally, information on DTC advertising can facilitate further research on 
the evaluation of public policy concerning advertising in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.  
In light of increasing attempts to limit consumers’ exposure to false or misleading DTC advertising (GAO, 
2006), studies on the persuasive versus informative role of DTC advertising will be an interesting and 
useful endeavor for future studies. Furthermore, we encourage future research to investigate the role of 
advertising and product differentiation at the product level. For example, one could investigate the impact 
of DTC advertising of a blockbuster on its sales. Such studies could give more details on the contribution of 
advertising. Additionally, such studies could compare R&D and advertising returns at the project level in 
order to assess their effectiveness. It is also interesting to generalize our findings to other high tech 
industries to see whether similar patterns exist. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION OF DRUG PRODUCTS AND COMPANIES 
 
The data of drug products are obtained from the Drugs@fda website.10 This website provides a 
downloadable database file, which contains a zip file with seven text file documents containing a dataset on 
product approvals. For the purpose of our studies, we used three of them, namely: (1) RegActionDate.txt; 
(2) Application.txt; and (3) Product.txt. 
For the explanation of each document, we refer to the website. We included only approvals with type N, S, 
SE1, SE2, SE3, SE4, SE5, SE6, SE7, SE8, SES, SED. These are approval types for NDA, ANDA, biologic 
drugs, and supplement types. For more detailed explanations of approval types we refer to the file 
DocType_lookup.txt on the website. We merged all three documents using STATA and produced 12.699 
drugs approvals. The first approval date is on 11 November 1911 and the latest is on 26 August 200611. 
Note that the next approval after 11 November 1911 is on 9 February 1939. Because of this large gap, we 
excluded the first approval of drug products in 1911 and therefore we cover the drugs approvals between 
the period 1939-2005. To avoid multiple counting, we count only once for drugs with the same active 
ingredient that was approved on the same day. For example, Ziagen, with active ingredient Abacavir 
Sulfate, was approved for the first time on 17 December 1998. This NCE was approved in two dosage 
forms, so it appears in the database twice. We count this only once and therefore the applicant had only one 
NCE approved on this date according the final data.  Eliminating multiple approvals on the same day with 
the same active ingredients brings us to a number of 10.368 approvals in total. We assume that the day of 
approval is equal to the day of introduction. 
 
A.1 CLASSIFICATION OF DRUG PRODUCTS: NCE, IMD AND GENERIC 
The dataset provided by drugs@FDA does not allow us directly to distinguish drug products into NCE, 
IMD or generic. We used the following procedure. First, we identified generic applications as follows. We 
observed that generic application has application numbers between 40000 and 49999 or between 60000 and 
8999912. Our procedure successfully traces generic drug applications and found that 5614 approvals (54%) 
are categorized as generic applications. This implies that the rest of the drug approvals, i.e. 46%, are NDA 
applications. 
From the population of NDA applications, we distinguished NCE as the drug approval whose active 
ingredient has never been approved before. This implies that we categorized all drug products based on its 
active ingredient and ranked them by date of approval. The first drug product approved in a certain active 
ingredient category, i.e. the drug product that has the earliest date of approval, is classified as NCE. This 
procedure is performed in STATA. We found 1243 NCEs, or 12% of all drugs approved in the period 1939-
2005. The rest is classified as incrementally modified drugs (IMDs). For example, fluoxetine chloride, 
known with trade marks Prozac or Sarafem, is first approved in 29 December 1987. Since that time until 31 
December 2005, there were 67 additional drug approvals with this active ingredient (excluding drugs that 
combine this active ingredient with others), of which 55 are ANDA applications. The first approval in 1987 
 
10 (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda) 
11 This is a generic application whose date is an expected date of approval. In many occasions, the expected date can 
be known in advance due to regulations (see section 2.2.1). 
12 This is after years of examination of the database. Additionally we took a random sample and check it manually. 
The results show that we can be confident about this classification. 
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is classified as NCE, 55 are classified as generic and the rest (12 approvals) are categorized as IMDs. Note 
that we took into account combinations and derivations of active ingredients in defining NCEs. 
 
A.2 FIRM SELECTION 
The dataset that is provided by drugs@FDA provides information on the sponsor companies of drug 
applications. In total, there are 596 different sponsor companies in the dataset in the period 1939-2005. We 
choose 27 companies in our final sample based on the following criteria. First, companies had to be listed in 
the U.S. stock market. Second, selected companies must have the majority of their product portfolios 
consisting of brand-name drugs, i.e. NDA approval. Especially, we limited the final companies to ones that 
have at least 50% of their total products consisting of NDA approvals. By doing this, we concentrated only 
on brand-name pharmaceutical companies and therefore excluded pharmaceutical companies that focus on 
producing generic drug products. Lastly, we required that selected companies must have at least four years 
of data on drug approvals and financial data. The final companies are the so-called brand-name companies, 
i.e. pharmaceutical companies that specialize in producing brand-name drugs.  
We also took into account some major mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry. From 
company website we traced that companies underwent a merger and/or acquisition. This is not always 
processed on time by FDA. We take this into account by looking at the year of the merger or acquisition 
and grouping drug approvals of both companies into one entity after the date of the merger. For example, 
Pfizer acquired Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical in June 2000. Warner-Lambert brought two subsidiary 
companies; Agouron and Parke Davis. We grouped all drugs sponsored by Warner, Agouron and Parke 
Davies into Pfizer starting on 1 January 2001. 
Figure A.1 provides the comparison of total NDA approvals and NDA approvals from our final sample. 
This figure shows that even though our sample does not cover the whole population, it does represent the 
industry trend.  
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Figure B.1 Comparison of NDA approvals in the population and in the sample 
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Table A.1 U.S. Pharmaceutical Firms Included in the Study 
3M Mallinckrodt 
Abbott McNeil Corp. 
Allergan Medicis 
Amgen Merck 
AstraZeneca Novartis 
Bayer  Novo 
Biovail Pfizer 
BristolMyersSquibb Pharmacia 
Forest Labs Schering 
Genentech Schering Plough 
GD Searle Serono  
GlaxoSmithKline Shire 
King Pharmaceuticals Wyeth 
Eli Lilly  
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A.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE FDA DATABASE 
The CDER database is limited in the sense that it only registers the latest sponsor of the drugs, not 
necessarily the one that introduced them in the first place. Once a company was taken over by another firm 
or merged with other companies, the database put all the drugs introduced by the initial companies into the 
new company13. Therefore, we only used data on introduction preceding a merger or acquisition. For 
example, we do not include GlaxoSmithKline, one of the big pharmaceutical companies, because we only 
have three years of accurate data after the big merger between Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline in 2001. 
Before 2001, we cannot trace whether a particular drug belonged to Glaxo Wellcome or to SmithKline. 
Furthermore, we only include observations after year 1989 for Bristol Myers Squibb, the year in which 
Bristol Myers merged with Squibb.  
 
13 We obtain data on merger and acquisition by consulting the company’s history from the company, the Financial 
Times database, and CRSP.  
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APPENDIX B: REPLACING MISSING VALUES FOR ADVERTISING  
 
In this appendix we describe the procedure of how we replaced missing values of advertising and how we 
came up with the final dataset used in the analysis. Financial data of companies in our data that was 
obtained from Compustat database had a considerable gap, especially in advertising data. We applied the 
following procedure to replace missing values of advertising. First, although Compustat contains financial 
data back in 1950, we only used observations after 1970. The main reason is that advertising data is not 
available for all companies prior to 1970. Moreover, advertising data is not available for all companies, 
even after 1970. Many companies in our dataset do not have consecutive financial data, including 
advertising, prior to 1980. Some companies do not even have data prior to 1990. By taking this into 
account, our final dataset is an unbalanced panel data, where few of the big players have data since 1971, 
while many others start much later.  
This final dataset, however, still contains considerable gaps in advertising data; 32% of our final 
observations do not have advertising expenditure. This gap in advertising especially exists in the period 
1993-2005. The staff of COMPUSTAT whom we contacted on this matter informed us that these 
companies did not provide the information on advertising data in this period.  
To get more information, we consulted the companies’ annual report via internet. Especially, we looked at 
the cost of selling or marketing at the financial statement of companies with considerable gaps in 
advertising expenditure.  Because company usually only report the most recent annual reports, i.e. the last 5 
years, we can only gather information after 1997. Financial statement reports the so called marketing and 
administration expenses and sometimes they also call it selling and distribution expenses. Indeed, we found 
different variations on the name of this account, such as: marketing & administrative; selling, administrative 
& general; marketing and selling; and marketing and distribution. We acknowledge that this account 
consists not only of advertising, but also other purposes such as administration, distribution and selling cost 
in general. Therefore, we use a proxy of this account to estimate the advertising expenditure. After 
replacing most recent missing values using information from companies’ financial statement, approximately 
18% of advertising data is missing. We replace the missing values left by linear extrapolation. Extrapolation 
is performed in STATA by using the ipolate command. 
We used a trial and error procedure to determine the size of the proxy by comparing two figures; (1) the 
annual average of advertising values from original Compustat data that contains missing values and (2) the 
annual average of advertising values after replacing missing values with information from annual report and 
with extrapolation.  Figure B.1 to B.4 show the comparison between the annual average of advertising from 
the original dataset and the annual average of advertising in the final dataset. The latter is obtained, as has 
been mentioned above, by using various percentages of marketing and administration (proxies), which is 
obtained from the annual report of companies. The solid line in each figure represents the annual average of 
available advertising expenditure of all companies in each year based on the Compustat data. The dashed 
line shows the average advertising data of all companies for each year, after (1) replacing the missing 
advertising data with various proxies (1 or 100%, 50%, 20%, and 10%) of marketing & administration from 
the annual report and, thereafter, (2) we replaced the missing values left by linear extrapolation.  
As the above figure shows, advertising as a 20% of total cost of marketing & administration seems to be a 
reasonable proxy. We also consulted some information from companies that do provide advertising data. 
For example, in its notes to financial statements, Pfizer declares advertising expenditure in 2004 and 2005, 
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which is approximately 19% of total marketing and administration cost in that years14. We found a similar 
figure for Bristol Myers Squibb as well, one of few companies that reported advertising expenditure.  
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that companies such as Abbott and GlaxoSmithKline have lower actual 
proxies than 20% in the same years. Nevertheless, we think that 20% as is a reasonable proxy. 
Our final financial dataset consists of 599 firm-year observations, ranging in the period 1971-2005 and 
consisting of 27 companies. Minimal firm-year observation for each firm is six years, and maximal is 35 
years. This dataset is, therefore, an unbalanced panel data. In total, we use less than 599 observations, 
namely 596 observations for the regression analysis due to the use of sales in the previous year to calculate 
growth of log sales. 
Figure B.1 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=1) 
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14 http://www.pfizer.com/pfizer/annualreport/2005/financial/financial2005.pdf
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Figure B.2 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=0.5) 
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Figure B.3 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=0.2) 
 
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
V
al
ue
 in
 m
illi
on
 $
 d
ol
la
r
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Available Advertising Data Values by Extrapolation Using Proxy 0.2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.4 The Original Versus the Final Advertising (Proxy=0.1) 
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
V
al
ue
 in
 m
illi
on
 $
 d
ol
la
r
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Available Advertising Data Values by Extrapolation Using Proxy 0.1
 
 
 
 
 26
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Strategy and Entrepreneurship” 
 
2007 
 
Longitudinal Study on the Performance of U.S. Pharmaceutical Firms: The Increasing Role of Marketing 
L.H. Pattikawa 
ERS-2007-020-STR 
                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing  
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
